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ABSTRACT 
Based on conflicting Federal Circuit case law, many academics have 
written, and many practitioners likely believe, that claim meanings or 
their applications may expand over time for purposes of literal 
infringement. But this common wisdom is wrong. Under existing Federal 
Circuit rules, the first precedent controls in the event of a conflict over 
doctrine, unless and until reversed en banc. The first precedent on the 
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issue, the 2000 Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. case, held that claim scope 
does not reach after-arising technologies for literal infringement and 
suggested that if it did, then such claims would lack written description 
support. Under existing validity precedents, temporally expanding claim 
scope would violate both § 112(a)’s enablement and written description 
requirements, as explicitly held in the 1977 In re Hogan decision and as 
implied by the more recent 2010 Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co. 
en banc decision. Further, were claims able to expand over time for literal 
infringement, they would violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope 
for validity and infringement. Once it is recognized that claim scope for 
literal infringement does not protect against after-arising technologies, 
further resort will be made to seek such protection under the doctrine of 
equivalents. This not only highlights the importance of the Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals decision but also will cause a big change to current 
practices and will lead to increased uncertainty regarding the scope of 
patent protection. 
This Article explains why academics and practitioners may be 
confused regarding the U.S. law of literal infringement’s temporal scope. 
It describes the conflicting cases that have led to that confusion. And it 
explains why § 112(f)’s rule of construction for functional claiming 
language may be understood to limit all claim scope to temporally fixed, 
known-to-be equivalent technologies. This Article concludes by noting 
potential conflict with the pioneering invention doctrine and concerns 
should the law be changed to permit claiming the future. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The modern “doctrine of equivalents” protects patent holders from 
infringement by after-arising technologies (also referred to as later-arising 
technologies) deemed factually equivalent to technologies known to be 
claim embodiments as of the effective filing date of claims. As the 
Supreme Court held in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo, Kabushiki 
Co., Ltd.,1 where “[t]he equivalent [to embodiments of the construed 
claim language] may have been unforeseeable at the time of the 
application,” a presumptive prosecution history estoppel created by 
adopting a narrowing claim amendment will not bar a finding of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.2 
But that leaves an important question unaddressed. That question is 
whether, for purposes of so-called “literal” infringement, interpreted 
1. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002). 
2. Id. at 741 (emphasis added). 
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claim meaning and the application of such meaning: (1) may expand over 
time to encompass such after-arising, equivalent technologies; or (2) must 
remain fixed in time and excludes such technologies from being 
considered claim embodiments.3 If claim meaning or the scope of 
application of such meaning can expand over time for literal infringement 
purposes, then there is less need to resort to the doctrine of equivalents to 
protect against after-arising technologies. However, if claim meaning or 
application scope is limited to technologies that were known as of the 
filing date to be claim embodiments, then the doctrine of equivalents is 
necessary for any such protection. 
As stated in 2000 by former Chief Judge Rader of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) in his en banc 
concurrence in the Festo case prior to the Supreme Court’s decision: 
A primary justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to accommodate 
such unforeseeable, after-arising technology. Without a doctrine of 
equivalents, any claim drafted in current technological terms could be 
easily circumvented after the advent of an advance in technology. . . . 
Fortunately, the doctrine of equivalents accommodates that 
unforeseeable dilemma for claim drafters.4 
Judge Rader’s discussion implicitly suggests that literal claim meaning 
and application scope is limited to equivalent known-to-be embodiments 
at the time of application filing. It also implicitly suggests that the doctrine 
of equivalents protects against after-arising technologies that could not 
validly be claimed under the written description doctrine. After-arising 
technologies are unforeseeable and therefore are not subjectively 
“possessed” by the applicant (nor objectively disclosed for skilled artisans 
to “visualize or recognize”) as of the filing date.5 
Nevertheless, I believe that Judge Rader’s view is not the common 
wisdom. Rather, many academic writers state, and practitioners likely 
assume, that under current U.S. patent law, claim meaning or claim 
application scope may permissibly expand over time for literal 
infringement purposes. In doing so, claims may encompass after-arising 
technologies that were unforeseeable at the time of filing an application, 
i.e., not constructively recognized as claim embodiments by skilled
3. See generally Kevin E. Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising 
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2008). 
4. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (Rader, J., concurring), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
5. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
Cf. id. at 1352 (“[A] description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the 
requirement.”). 
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practitioners. I believe that this common wisdom is wrong, even if there 
are good reasons (from conflicting case holdings) why the common 
wisdom is thought to be the current law.6 
The reason that I believe that the common wisdom is wrong is the 
failure to recognize and apply the Federal Circuit’s rule regarding 
controlling precedent. That rule requires that an earlier-in-time panel 
precedent controls in the event of a conflict over doctrine, unless and until 
the Federal Circuit goes en banc to reverse that earlier precedent.7 Given 
the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent or en banc precedent on the 
issue of literal infringement by after-arising technologies, the earliest 
panel precedent controls. And the earliest precedent on the issue, Schering 
Corp. v. Amgen, Inc.,8 limits the temporal meaning and scope of 
application for literal infringement purposes to equivalent technologies 
known to be embodiments of the claim language as of effective filing date 
of the claim.9 
Further, a holding that claim meaning may permissibly expand over 
time for literal infringement purposes so as to capture such after-arising 
technologies would violate the “axiomatic” equivalency of claim scope 
for purposes of validity and infringement.10 Claim meaning and 
6. In fact, I made the same mistaken assumption in prior work, relying on conflicting
decisions to suggest that claim meaning should be understood to be fixed as of the filing date, but that 
claim application scope may expand over time. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of Equivalents 
and Claiming the Future after Festo, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 403, 428–32 (2004) (citing and discussing 
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004), SuperGuide Corp. v. 
DirectTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb 
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Cf. id. at 432 n.147, 434 n.162 (discussing 
Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000), without recognizing that it controls 
the issue). 
7. See, e.g., Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc). Cf. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“A panel decision cannot overturn any precedential ruling of the court, 
even of a prior panel, much less that of an in banc court. See, e.g., Capital Elec., Inc. v. United States, 
729 F.2d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (only court sitting in banc can overrule an earlier panel 
decision).”). 
8. Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
9. See id. at 1351–53. 
10. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). See, e.g., 
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., 842 F.2d at 1279, Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1449 
(Fed. Cir. 1984), and Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). See 
also Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Because 
the claims of a patent measure the invention at issue, the claims must be interpreted and given the 
same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses.”). Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 
Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“It has been an inviolate rule 
that patent claims are construed the same way for validity and for infringement.”) (citing cases). 
4
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application scope have long been limited to known embodiments of claim 
meaning as of the filing date for validity purposes under enablement cases. 
Patent specifications could not enable such temporally expanding claim 
meanings or application scope, as held In re Hogan,11 a seminal 1977 
precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (whose precedents 
were adopted along with Court of Claims precedents as binding Federal 
Circuit precedents).12 The same premises also apply under the written 
description doctrine cases. The specifications for such claims could not 
demonstrate that the applicant “possessed” the full scope of the claims as 
of the filing date, under the 2010 en banc holding in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co.13 
Thus, if claim meaning or application scope was construed to 
encompass after-arising technologies, the claim would necessarily be 
invalid. The Schering precedent assures that literal infringement claim 
meaning and application scope are co-extensive with validity claim 
meaning and application scope and, consequently, that claims are not 
invalidated on this basis. Conversely, any claims construed for literal 
infringement that would extend to after-arising technology should be held 
invalid, and thus would be incapable of being literally infringed. This 
highlights the importance of the Ariad Pharmaceuticals decision, as it not 
only limits claim scope but also precludes claims from being infringed by 
after-arising technologies. 
Recognizing that literal infringement scope does not protect against 
any after-arising equivalent technologies, however, will result in 
substantial changes to existing patent practices. Insubstantial but 
subsequent changes to existing technologies, such as in software, will then 
be recognized as incapable of literally infringing. In particular, the 
recognition will generate even greater pressure to resort to the doctrine of 
equivalents to achieve such protection, and will generate greater 
procedural complexity and uncertainty regarding the scope of patent 
protection. This will pose even more starkly the concerns with relying on 
the doctrine of equivalents that were expressed by Lord Hoffmann in 
2004, well before the recent change in United Kingdom (U.K.) law to 
11. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (limiting claim meaning for
enablement doctrine to the meaning and claim embodiments recognized at the time of filing to avoid 
having later, unforeseeable technological developments invalidate claims); S. Corp. v. United States, 
690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
12. S. Corp., 690 F.2d at 1370 (adopting as precedents holdings of the Court of Claims and of 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals prior to October 1, 1982). 
13. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming 
the written description adequacy test of an objective disclosure of subjective mental “possession” of 
the full scope of claimed subject matter). 
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adopt a doctrine of equivalents14 and to restrict reliance on so-called 
“purposive interpretation”15 for literal infringement determinations. As 
Lord Hoffmann noted earlier when rejecting the doctrine of equivalents, 
“once the monopoly ha[s] been allowed to escape from the terms of the 
claims, it is not easy to know where its limits should be drawn.”16 And as 
Lord Hoffmann further noted by comparison, “American patent litigants 
[will] pay dearly for results which are no more just or predictable than 
could be achieved by simply reading the claims.”17 
The understanding that literal infringement scope does not reach 
after-arising technologies also does not conflict with the doctrine of 
equivalents holding of the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.18 In regard to what is now § 112(f),19 Warner-
Jenkinson held that when Congress adopted a special interpretive rule for 
claim terms employing functional language, Congress did not thereby 
foreclose a doctrine of equivalents that provides protection beyond the 
scope of application of construed claim meaning.20 But prohibiting literal 
14. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis UK Ltd. [2017] UKSC 48, [54]. 
15. See Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. [1982] RPC 183, 184; Improver Corp.
v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd. [1990] F.S.R. 181; Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel 
Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46. Cf. Katherine Stephens, Actavis v Lilly – A Year After the Revolution, in ICLG 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL GUIDE TO PATENTS 2019 4 (9th ed. 2019) (“In Generics v. Yeda, in the 
first decision to be handed down after Actavis, Arnold J was emphatically of the opinion that the law 
remained that a patent claim should be given a purposive and not a literal construction.”). See 
generally Paul England, The scope of protection of patent claims in Europe and the UPC, 11 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 689, 690–91 (2016) (describing purposive interpretation in the U.K.). 
16. Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, [39]. 
17. Id. at [44]. See Paul Cole, Letter to the Editor, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 642, 
643 (2005) (“However, according to Lord Hoffmann, what courts can do is to give the claim language 
an extended meaning. . . . Furthermore, construction of claims to cover new technology is clearly 
permissible.”). Cf. Sarnoff, supra note 6 at 1157 (2004) (“As under the European Patent Convention, 
any residual fairness concerns would be addressed better by nonliterally interpreting claim language 
than by applying the modern doctrine of equivalents.”). See generally Alexandra K. Pechtold, The 
Evolution of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, 87 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 412 (2005). 
18. See generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
19. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018). 
20. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27–28 (“Because § 112, ¶ 6, was enacted as a targeted 
cure to a specific problem, and because the reference in that provision to ‘equivalents’ appears to be 
no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure, such limited congressional 
action should not be overread for negative implications. Congress in 1952 could easily have 
responded to Graver Tank as it did to the Halliburton decision. But it did not.”) (citing Graver Tank 
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) and Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. 
Walker, 321 U.S. 1 (1946)). I have argued elsewhere that Congress also did not impliedly ratify 
Graver Tank’s creation of a doctrine of equivalents extending protection beyond the scope of 
application of construed claim language. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines 
of Equivalence and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870-1950), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
441, 483–90 (2005) [hereinafter Sarnoff, DOE Part II]. Thus, courts remain free to restore the doctrine 
6
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claim meaning and application scope from applying to after-arising 
technologies may raise concerns regarding a possible conflict with the 
pioneering invention (or pioneering patent) doctrine. That doctrine was 
based on the lack of prior art to restrict claim meaning and application 
scope that would otherwise invalidate broad claims.21 But the pioneering 
invention doctrine could be understood to authorize the use of broad 
claiming language that is intended to (or that may be construed to) apply 
literally to after-arising technology that was not earlier recognized as a 
claim embodiment. It is unclear whether the pioneering invention doctrine 
remains in force (and In re Hogan did not ultimately reach that issue22); 
if it permits claiming after-arising technology, it would then break the 
axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for validity and literal infringement. 
To the extent that such future-regarding claiming language is authorized 
explicitly or by construction of language that has no temporal limitation, 
such claims under current law would clearly reach beyond the scope of 
the disclosed invention enabled at the time of filing and “possessed” by 
the applicant.23 Such claims should thus be invalid under current validity 
to its historic role of defining the scope of claim application however broadly or narrowly, literally or 
liberally, the claim language is construed. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines 
of Equivalence and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
371, 391–97 (2005). 
21. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2018); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
805 F.2d 1558 (1986), reh’g denied, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (arguing that the “liberal” 
construction of pioneering invention claims “is not a manifestation of a different legal standard based 
on an abstract legal concept denominated ‘pioneer.’ Rather, the ‘liberal’ view flows directly from the 
relative sparseness of prior art in nascent fields of technology.”) (quoting Morley Sewing Mach. Co. 
v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 286 (1889)). See also Brothers v. United States, 250 U.S. 88, 89 (1919);
McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 404–08 (20 How. 1857). 
22. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“Though we do not reach the
point on this appeal, we note appellants’ argument that their invention is of ‘pioneer’ status.”); Brian 
J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 382–83 (2012) (discussing 
Tex. Instruments, Inc. and the “[c]onventional wisdom . . . that the [pioneering invention patent] 
doctrine was killed more than twenty years ago.”); John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent 
Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 52 (1995) (“[I]n one sense the doctrine of 
equivalents remedies the anomaly in the law that exists whenever a pioneer patent is not literally 
infringed by the very subject matter which was spawned by the disclosure of that pioneer patent.”). 
Cf. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 610 (Miller, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the majority opinion, to permit the 
‘outer boundaries’ of a claim to be construed in light of later art, rather than in light of art at the time 
the patent application was filed, could well impede progress in the useful arts.”). 
23. See authority cited supra note 13 and accompanying text. Cf. Love, supra note 22, at 384
(assuming the expansion of claim meaning over time, either by construction or reissue; “claims [for 
pioneer inventions] will naturally expand with time as technical terminology evolves and hindsight 
bias takes effect.”); Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 1157 (“The Supreme Court or Congress also may need 
to impose additional limits on the ability to claim later-arising technologies for patent law to serve its 
constitutional purpose of promoting progress.”). 
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doctrines, unless the axiomatic equivalency of validity and literal 
infringement scope is to be broken. 
Resolving these tensions will require rethinking (at some point) the 
permissible scope of claiming and the role of the doctrine of equivalents 
and the pioneering invention doctrine.24 This Article, however, simply 
emphasizes that the best understanding of the current law in the U.S. is 
that claims may not apply to after-arising technologies for literal 
infringement purposes. Claims employing language that expressly seeks 
to cover future but constructively unknown embodiments should be held 
invalid as lacking both enablement and written description support, and 
thus cannot be infringed. And under current claim construction doctrine, 
claim language that is ambiguous regarding such future application scope 
should be construed not to encompass after-arising technology so as to 
preserve claim validity.25 Thus, we may be stuck for the foreseeable future 
in the U.S. with the doctrine of equivalents as the sole means to provide 
protection for after-arising equivalent technologies. And other countries 
including the U.K. now face the same questions.26 
In Part II, I discuss the common (but not universal) wisdom that 
claim meaning and application scope permissibly may expand to cover 
after-arising technology for literal infringement purposes. I demonstrate 
that the common wisdom is based on conflicting Federal Circuit 
precedents that fail to follow the earliest panel precedent Schering. The 
goal is to bring the conflicts to light, so that a proper understanding of the 
current law may be applied or, alternatively, the law may be changed. 
24. Compare, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 1213 (“[I]f any additional protection beyond the
scope of application of the literal meaning of claim limitations were thought to be necessary, nonliteral 
claim construction should be a preferable alternative to the modern doctrine. . . . The facts of the Festo 
case provide a concrete example of why literal interpretation should be preferred, and why nonliteral 
interpretation would be a better alternative than the modern doctrine to remedy (mistakenly) perceived 
unfairness.”), with England, supra note 15, at 697 (applicants “cannot be expected to predict what 
future technological developments might be made. . . . However, in practice, despite the above 
recognition of a doctrine of equivalents, many courts have to a large degree moved towards an 
approach that places claim language at the center of the infringement analysis and in which the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents is something of a last resort to avoid an inequitable result.”). 
25. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“While 
we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we have 
not applied that principle broadly” where “the claim term at issue is not ambiguous.”) (citing Klein 
v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 433, 466 (1873)). 
26. I am, however, now more sympathetic to the temporal limitation problem that, at its core,
the modern doctrine of equivalents addresses. My increased sympathy for the doctrine of equivalents 
may provide a useful lesson about, if not an antidote to, the increasing pressures for and tendencies 
of (particularly younger) scholars to publish more frequently and quickly, without taking adequate 
time to really learn the entire history and without spending even more time and effort—rather than 
less and less—to fully consider that history and how their proposals relate to it. 
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In Part III, I explain why, as the earliest panel precedent, the Schering 
case controls the current doctrine and, therefore, why claims may not 
apply to after-arising technologies for literal infringement purposes. 
Schering clearly held that literal claim meaning and application scope 
cannot extend to after-arising technologies, while also suggesting that 
claims would be invalid as lacking written description support if they did. 
I also discuss in more detail the critical precedents that followed Schering, 
some of which generated the conflicting views discussed in Part II without 
even citing Schering, much less attempting to distinguish its precedent. 
But even if these later cases were somehow thought to control the issue of 
literal infringement by after-arising technologies, then such claims should 
simply be held invalid under the en banc Ariad Pharmaceuticals written 
description precedent, and thus would be incapable of being infringed. 
In Part IV, I briefly explain why Congress in 1952 may be thought 
to have precluded claim language from applying to after-arising 
technologies for literal infringement purposes. Specifically, in the 
predecessor to § 112(f), Congress mandated a specific interpretive rule for 
functional claiming language.27 That rule has been interpreted by the 
Federal Circuit for literal infringement purposes to temporally limit claim 
scope to technologies known-to-be equivalent to disclosed claim 
embodiments as of the filing date and that perform the identical function 
claimed.28 Although structural claiming language is not formally subject 
to the interpretive rule of § 112(f), the failure to temporally limit structural 
claim term meanings to temporally fixed embodiments then requires 
functional determinations to assess the scope of application of such 
structural meanings.29 Thus, permitting structural claim meaning and 
application scope to apply to equivalent after-arising technologies that 
were not constructively recognized by skilled persons to be claim 
embodiments by the filing date effectively converts structural claiming 
language into functional claiming language. And then, such structural 
claiming language should be subject to the same § 112(f) temporal 
limitation rule for literal infringement that currently applies to explicitly 
functional claiming language.30 
27. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018). 
28. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
29. Cf. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relevant
portion en banc) (discussing purportedly structural terms that require determination of whether 
allegedly infringing things “perform[] a specified function”); id. at 1351 (“[T]he fact that one of skill 
in the art could program a computer to perform the recited functions cannot create structure where 
none otherwise is disclosed.”). 
30. See, e.g., id. at 1349–51 (discussing “nonce words”). 
9
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II. CONFUSION OVER WHETHER LITERAL INFRINGEMENT CLAIM
MEANING OR APPLICATION SCOPE MAY EXPAND OVER TIME TO AFTER-
ARISING TECHNOLOGIES. 
As Professor Donald Chisum put it in his leading treatise, “[t]he time 
framework for construing patent claims is the subject of surprisingly 
sparse judicial authority.”31 Yet many practical treatises and academic 
works indicate that claim meaning (or the scope of application of that 
meaning) either (1) may expand over time to encompass after-arising 
technologies for literal infringement purposes or (2) may not do so. They 
arrived at those conclusions based on conflicting case law. This is true 
even though the courts and commentators uniformly treat claim meaning 
and application scope as temporally fixed for validity purposes. 
In regard to validity, Professor Chisum noted one decision of the 
Supreme Court that focused on the filing date for definiteness and noted 
various decisions of the Federal Circuit alternatively focusing on the filing 
date or the date of invention.32 Specifically, in Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig 
Instruments, Inc.,33 the Supreme Court stated that “[d]efiniteness is 
measured from the viewpoint of a person skilled in [the] art at the time the 
patent was filed.”34 In discussing this decision, Professor Chisum noted: 
The Court was not addressing the issue of the filing date versus the 
invention date. Rather, the Court was rejecting the position that claim 
definiteness could be assessed from a later, post-filing date, claim-
construction perspective. However, because definiteness is closely 
linked to claim construction, the Nautilus statement tended to support 
the view that the filing date should control.35 
When reviewing earlier Federal Circuit validity decisions in regard 
to the timing of claim construction and application scope, Professor 
Chisum concluded: 
The enablement and written disclosure requirements [particularly In re 
Hogan], which provide essential support for a patent’s claims, are 
measured according to the patent’s effective application filing date. It 
would seem to follow that, to the extent that the meaning of a patent 
claim depends on the state of the art or on tests, standards or 
measurements established in the art, the time framework should be the 
31. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03(2)(g) (2020) [hereinafter CHISUM 
ON PATENTS] (discussing “Time Framework”). 
32. See, e.g., id. 
33. Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014). 
34. Id. at 908 (citations omitted). 
35. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g).
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/1
2019] CORRECTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS 777 
filing date. Nevertheless, Federal Circuit decisions have stated, without 
analysis, that the relevant date is the date of invention, which is only 
presumed to be the application filing date.36 
In contrast, when discussing the temporal frame for literal 
infringement claim meaning and application scope, Professor Chisum did 
not draw any clear conclusions but simply described the various Federal 
Circuit cases and their holdings.37 Professor Chisum started by describing 
Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc.,38 and then discussed subsequent cases 
such as Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. Lucks Co.39 and SuperGuide Corp. 
v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.40 He also discussed in footnotes various
additional cases, such as Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics 
Corp.,41 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,42 and Innogenetics, N.V. v. 
Abbott Laboratories.43 
These cases, however, reached different results in regard to whether 
claim meaning or application scope for literal infringement purposes can 
apply to after-arising technologies. For example, in Kopykake 
Enterprises, the court relied upon Schering to hold that “when a claim 
term understood to have a narrow meaning when the application is filed 
later acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of the term is limited 
to what it was understood to mean at the time of filing.”44 In contrast, in 
Innogenetics, N.V., the court relied upon Superguide to hold that “[o]ur 
case law allows for after-arising technology to be captured within the 
literal scope of valid claims that are drafted broadly enough.”45 
36. Id. 
37. However, in a separate section on adequacy of disclosure, Professor Chisum notes that
“[t]he state of the art as of the filing date is used to determine whether the scope of a claim is 
commensurate with the scope of the disclosure in the specification.” 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra 
note 31, at § 7.03(3)(a)(ii). Professor Chisum also discusses there various timing cases, including In 
re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977), Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 7.03(3)(a)(ii). See id. (noting that the Federal Circuit in 
Plant Genetic Systems rejected the argument that “‘pioneer’ status would entitle a patent to a ‘lower 
enablement requirement’” that would justify broad claims without sufficient disclosure). 
38. Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
39. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
40. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
41. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
42. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
43. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See also CHISUM ON 
PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g). 
44. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1337, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Schering 
Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
45. Innogenetics, N.V., 512 F.3d at 1371–72 (quoting SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
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Although Professor Chisum did not discuss in this context the 
seminal, en banc Phillips v. AWH Corp.46 literal infringement claim 
construction methodology case, the Federal Circuit held in that case that 
claims should receive their “ordinary and customary” meaning for literal 
infringement purposes; that meaning “is the meaning that the term would 
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the 
invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”47 
As with the Supreme Court in Nautilus, however, the Federal Circuit in 
Phillips was not focused on the distinction of an earlier invention date 
from the filing date but rather on concerns for an excessive scope by 
relying on dictionary definitions that might include inappropriately broad 
(including later-developed) meanings.48 
The Phillips language and the conflicts among these cases are all the 
more remarkable given that, as Professor Chisum noted, in cases such as 
“PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp. (2005),49 the Federal 
Circuit emphasized that ‘[a] claim cannot have different meanings at 
different times.’ . . . [I]ts meaning must be interpreted as of its effective 
filing date.”50 Further, the court in PC Connector Solutions cited to 
another important en banc Federal Circuit decision on claim construction 
for literal infringement, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.51 
Markman similarly referred to what a skilled artisan would understand the 
claim term to mean “at the time of the invention.”52 Nevertheless, nothing 
in the en banc Phillips and Markman decisions therefore suggests that 
claim meaning or application scope encompasses technologies arising 
after the effective filing date of the relevant claim language. 
In contrast to Professor Chisum, in 2005 Professor Mark Lemley (in 
an important article cited by Chisum) directly addressed the changing 
temporal reference frame sometimes given to claim term meanings by the 
46. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
47. Id. at 1312–13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) and citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 
1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). Cf. Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116 (“A court 
construing a patent claim seeks to accord a claim the meaning it would have to a person of ordinary 
skill in the art at the time of the invention.”) (emphasis added). 
48. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (“The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such
prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning 
of claim terms within the context of the patent.”). Cf. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at 
§ 18.03(2)(g). 
49. PC Connector Sols. LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
50. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g) (quoting PC Connector Sols., 406 
F.3d at 1363). 
51. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
52. PC Connector Sols., 406 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 986). 
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Federal Circuit.53 As usual, Professor Lemley cogently summarized the 
common wisdom that had developed by that time regarding temporally 
expanding claim meaning for literal infringement purposes. And 
Professor Lemley stated, based on the case law, such changing temporal 
meanings may sometimes include after-arising technologies as claim 
embodiments for literal infringement purposes: 
It is a fundamental principle of patent law that the time as of which we 
determine the meaning of claim terms varies depending on what legal 
rule is at issue. . . . And where the question involves alleged 
infringement of the patent, courts evaluate infringement in at least some 
circumstances based on the meaning of the claim at the time of 
infringement.54 
Similarly, the leading patent law textbook authors, Professors Robert 
Merges and John Duffy, have explained that for literal infringement 
purposes courts do not fix the meaning of claim terms as of the filing date, 
but rather as of the time of infringement.55 In explaining how 
improvement patents for non-obvious after-arising technologies can 
infringe without rendering the underlying patent invalid for lack of 
enablement, the authors noted that although: 
the enablement inquiry is forever pegged to the time of application 
filing . . . for purposes of infringement, however, the coverage of the 
claim is determined at the time of the alleged infringement. . . . For 
infringement purposes, the phrase will be interpreted as of a later date. 
If the improvement is a “fuzzball” as the term was understood at that 
later date, then it infringes.56 
The textbook authors justify the differential treatment of claim term 
meanings as fixed for enablement and as expanding over time for 
infringement based on seminal theoretical work addressing after-arising 
53. See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g) n.961 (citing Mark A. Lemley,
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005)). 
54. Lemley, supra note 53, at 102–03 (last emphasis in original). See also id. at 108 n.31
(discussing Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974)). Cf. id. at 
104 n.12, 116 n.59, 118 n.72 (identifying the Schering case in three footnotes without expanding on 
the decision in detail); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1757 (2009) (citing and discussing Chiron Corp. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 
Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004), without citing Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
55. See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2017). 
56. Id. at 274–75 (emphasis added). 
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technology by Professor Kevin Collins.57 Collins’s work is well worth 
reading on its own, but for present purposes regarding common beliefs 
about the state of the law, Professor Merges and Duffy summarize 
Collins’s approach as follows: 
According to Collins, claim meaning for purposes of enablement is 
defined with reference to all those possible embodiments defined by the 
claims on the patent’s filing date. For these purposes, claim meaning 
involves a mapping between the words of the claim and a class of actual, 
physical objects. This type of meaning is known as denotational 
meaning. By contrast, for purposes of infringement meaning is better 
described in terms of relationships among words. Meaning establishes a 
stable matrix of concepts that clarifies where one word stands with 
respect to other words; this type of meaning is called ideational meaning. 
The distinction between denotational meaning is fixed with respect to 
physical embodiments (or things in the world), while ideational meaning 
is not. . . . For purposes of enablement, meaning has a fixed, temporal 
aspect, defined by things in the world on the date the meaning is fixed. 
For infringement, meaning is not fixed in this way. Things that are 
described by words may change without the meaning of the word itself 
changing. Meaning for enablement is time-dependent . . . meaning for 
infringement is not (it is independent of the number and type of things 
in the world at a given time).58 
Just prior to Collins’s work, in 2004, I explained why I thought that 
the courts had failed to recognize that temporally fixed meanings might 
have different temporal scopes of application (embodiment scopes), as a 
result of increasing knowledge in the art regarding what things in the 
world met that fixed meaning. I also analyzed the various relevant and 
conflicting cases to explain that the Federal Circuit had alternately held 
that claim meaning may expand over time for infringement scope so as to 
apply to after-arising technologies, and that claim meaning may not 
expand over time for infringement scope.59 And although I mentioned the 
57. See Collins, supra note 3. 
58. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 55, at 275–77. Cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff & Edward D. Manzo, 
An Introduction to, Premises of, and Problems With Patent Claim Construction, in PATENT CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.4 n.20 (E. Manzo ed. 2019) (“[T]he level of generality 
(or ‘granularity’) matters to what is considered equivalent, and the scope of things encompassed by a 
temporally fixed meaning may actually expand over time (depending on the type of linguistic meaning 
referred to—’ideational’ meaning or ‘denotational’ meaning—that is considered to be fixed.”) (citing 
Collins, supra note 3, at 500). But cf. infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing 
intentional and extensional definitions of the meaning of terms). 
59. See Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 428–32 (citing and discussing Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1257, 
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Plant Genetic 
Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/1
2019] CORRECTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS 781 
Schering precedent in the context of claim amendments and changing 
application scope, I did not then explain why I believed that Schering 
controlled the issue (as the earliest panel precedent) and precluded literal 
infringement from encompassing after-arising technologies.60 
In contrast, in 2005, Professor Christopher Cotropia relied upon 
Schering to suggest that claim meaning and application scope may not 
expand over time for literal infringement purposes to encompass after-
arising technologies. As he stated: 
[t]he court in Hogan did not specifically hold that claim language can 
literally include after-arising technologies. In fact, the weight of Federal 
Circuit authority indicates the opposite, as discussed above and 
exemplified by the Schering decision. Thus, recent case law has 
emphasized the temporal limitation on literal claim meaning, prohibiting 
the literal capture of later-developed technologies.61 
In summary, the academic literature and court cases are in conflict 
over the ability of claim meaning or application scope to expand over time 
for purposes of literal infringement. This is true even though the cases 
generally establish both a fixed temporal meaning and application scope 
for validity purposes, and even though many cases explicitly state that 
claim meaning and application scope do not vary for validity and for 
literal infringement purposes.62 Given these conflicts and the fact that the 
leading commentators generally treat claim meaning to be interpreted at 
the time of infringement, and thus claims may permissibly expand their 
scope over time for purposes of literal infringement, many practitioners 
likely assume that this is the law. But it is not. Accordingly, it is long 
overdue to correct that misperceived but common wisdom. 
60. See id. at 432 n.147 (citing Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
61. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technology and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 167–68 (2005). 
62. Similar conflicts now are arising under United Kingdom law, given adoption of the
doctrine of equivalents and the separation of purposive interpretation scope for validity and 
infringement scope under the doctrine of equivalents. See Antony Craggs, News from Abroad – 
Technetix v. Teleste: Doctrine of Equivalents, PATENT DOCS (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/06/news-from-abroad-technetix-v-teleste-doctrine-of-
equivalents.html [https://perma.cc/TQA9-L4N6] (“As validity was not in issue in the case, however, 
the nexus between validity and the doctrine of equivalents was not addressed. This was a particularly 
acute issue because English law, prior to Actavis v. Lilly, conflated the test of novelty and 
infringement, namely a claim lacked novelty if the prior publication disclosed subject-matter which, 
if performed, would necessarily infringe the claim. In essence, the test for novelty elided construction 
with infringement, with the latter now including the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
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III. UNDER CURRENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT LAW, LITERAL CLAIM MEANING
AND APPLICATION SCOPE MAY NOT EXTEND TO AFTER-ARISING
TECHNOLOGIES. 
It is uncontested that neither claim meaning nor claim application 
scope may expand over time for validity purposes. This was clearly 
established in 1977 by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the 
famous In re Hogan case.63 The court held in Hogan that claim meaning 
for enablement could not be construed based on later-developed meanings 
in the art for claim terms, and that after-arising technologies that would 
embody such expanded meanings (relative to the meaning as of the 
effective filing date) should not be held to invalidate claims for lack of 
enablement.64 But Hogan expressly did not reach the question of whether 
such claim meanings could be construed for literal infringement purposes 
based on the later-developed meanings of claim terms.65 Judge Miller in 
Hogan concurred separately and expressly to address that issue, and to 
suggest that claim terms could not and should not be construed based on 
later meanings for literal infringement purposes.66 
As Professor Cotropia noted in 2005, however, claims may employ 
broad terminology that is not limited to particular structures known at a 
particular time to embody those terms (thereby effectively employing 
functional language). To construe those terms to cover after-arising 
63. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977). See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 53, at
106–07 (also citing Plant Genetic Sys., N.V., 315 F.3d at 1340). 
64. See Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605–07; see also id. at 606 (“To now say that appellants should
have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on this record did not exist until 1962, would be 
to impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system. . . . Consideration of a 
later existing state of the art in testing for compliance with § 112, first paragraph, would not only 
preclude the grant of broad claims, but would wreak havoc in other ways as well.”). 
65. See id. at 607 (explaining the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) concern that
permitting the claim “might lead to enforcement efforts against the later developers. Any such 
conjecture, if it exists, is both irrelevant and unwarranted. The business of the PTO is patentability, 
not infringement.”). 
66. Id. at 610 (Miller, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the majority opinion, to permit the ‘outer 
boundaries’ of a claim to be construed in light of later art, rather than in light of art at the time the 
patent application was filed, could well impede progress in the useful arts. . . . The majority opinion 
notes . . . that any conjecture on this point [of potential broader infringement scope] is ‘both irrelevant 
and unwarranted,’ . . . . [But] the majority opinion advocates a double standard: for the inventor, 
interpret the language of the claims against later developers in light of the later state of the art; but for 
the PTO, as held here, interpret such language against the inventor only in light of the state of the art 
at the time the application was filed. I do not agree that such a double standard is needed to spur 
invention.”). Cf. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V., 315 F.3d at 1341 (stating that the discussion of pioneer 
patents in Hogan was “extended dicta”) (quoting Hogan, 559 F.2d at 610 (Miller, J., concurring) and 
citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606); id. (“We do not need to address all of the insightful comments made 
by the concurring judge; it is sufficient for the present case that we hold the district court did not err 
in not applying Hogan’s dicta to its enablement analysis.”). 
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technologies would not only generate enablement concerns, it would 
invariably result in a written description problem and add prohibited “new 
matter” to the application.67 The Federal Circuit in the en banc Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals case later impliedly affirmed this understanding, i.e., 
that claim scope must be limited to (at least constructively) known 
embodiments as of the date of application filing.68 If after-arising 
technologies were included within claim meaning for validity scope, the 
claims should necessarily fail the possession test, which requires an 
objective disclosure that would demonstrate to a person of ordinary skill 
that the applicant mentally recognized and possessed the full scope of the 
claimed invention. As the court stated in Ariad: 
a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical 
compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the 
specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the 
applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a 
genus. . . . [In Regents of the University of California v. Lilly,69 w]e held 
that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of 
either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the 
genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that 
one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the 
genus.70 
In regard to claim meaning and application scope for literal 
infringement purposes, the Federal Circuit’s 2000 decision in Schering 
Corp. v. Amgen Inc.71 appears to be the first Federal Circuit case directly 
addressing after-arising technologies, and therefore establishes the law 
unless and until overturned en banc. Nevertheless, Schering was then 
followed by other cases alternatively corroborating and conflicting with 
67. See Cotropia, supra note 61, at 165 (“The claims can be drafted to literally describe
technology not yet known, as demonstrated above. But the claims technically cannot capture the later-
developed technologies because to do so would require the claims to be interpreted as they are 
understood at some time after the filing date. ‘In fact, the quintessential example of an enforceable 
equivalent, after-arising technology, would always be unclaimable new matter’ for the patent as 
filed.”) (citation omitted); see also 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2018). 
68. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
69. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
70. Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1349–50 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at
1568–69) (emphasis added). Cf. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 
1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We do not read Hogan as allowing an inventor to claim what was 
specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed, unless the patent 
discloses how to make and use it.”) (emphasis added). 
71. See generally Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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its holding.72 I briefly discuss these cases in more detail below. However, 
it bears noting that the academic commentary also sometimes refers to a 
non-precedential 1974 case from the Seventh Circuit, Laser Alignment, 
Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc.73 And the academic commentary largely 
(and properly) ignores dicta in the 1977 Court of Claims Lockheed 
Aircraft v. United States case that might suggest that claims may be 
literally infringed by after-arising technologies,74 treating that case as a 
means-plus-function case subject to the temporal limitation rule, as well 
as actually addressing equivalents that were known in the art at the time 
of filing.75 
72. See, e.g., CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g); Lemley, supra note 53, at 
104, 108–10; Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1757. 
73. Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974). See, e.g., 
Lemley, supra note 53, at 108 n.31. Federal Circuit precedents that cite the case do not address its 
discussion of after-arising technologies. See, e.g., Coleco Indus. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com’n, 573 
F.2d 1247, 1257 n.9 (C.C.P.A 1978). 
74. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 79–80, 83–84 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(“Having determined that the claims in issue are entitled to a broad range of equivalents, the claims 
must next be read upon the accused device. As fully set forth in the findings, using claim 1 as a 
representative claim, it is clear that claim 1 literally reads on the accused device. The inquiry 
continues, however, for the accused device must additionally be shown to substantively infringe the 
claims by performing the same work, in substantially the same manner to achieve substantially the 
same result as the claimed device. . . . It is, of course, fundamental that a patentee need disclose only 
the best mode conceived by him for practicing the invention, not all conceivable modes. . . . [The 
inventor] was not ‘personally familiar’ with pulse compression in 1954 and the patent in suit 
appropriately reflects what he conceived to be the best mode at that time. This does not vitiate 
equivalency. It has long been settled that infringement is not avoided by an equivalent that was not 
known at the time of the invention.”) (citing WALKER ON PATENTS § 417 (1917 & 1929 eds.)) 
(emphasis added). Similarly, in d Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the 
discussion focused on not limiting claim construction to the best mode, absent any indication in the 
specification that the invention itself was limited to that disclosed embodiment. See id. at 399. 
Although the court upheld some findings of infringement by an after-arising technology, the decision 
did not focus on that question. Instead, it states that a “‘patentee’s broadest claim can be no broader 
than his actual invention,’” and, in the context of discussing prosecution history estoppel, that a 
patentee “cannot construe the claims narrowly before the Patent Office and later broadly before the 
courts.” Id. at 398–99. Further, in regard to many of the patent claims at issue, the court appears to 
have relied on the reverse doctrine of equivalents to avoid literal infringement, and where it found 
infringement did not explicitly discuss the after-arising nature of the technology. See id. at 403–14. 
Finally, the decision notes that the range of equivalents is broader for pioneer patents, but that in 
determining that range “‘[o]ne important guide is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would 
have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.’” 
Id. at 400 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). But to 
the extent that it construed claims to include such after-arising technologies, the Autogiro decision 
would appear to violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for infringement and validity and 
to be impliedly overruled by Ariad Pharmaceuticals.  
75. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 553 F.2d at 80–81 (discussing “means responsive” element 
of the claim); id. at 82 (citing Graver Tank and discussing known interchangeability for equivalency 
analysis); id. at 83–84 (focusing on the need to disclose only the best mode and that doing so does not 
vitiate equivalency); see also e.g., R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 4:87 n.9 (4th ed. 
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I am not aware of any Federal Circuit precedents decided between 
Hogan and Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. that directly and explicitly held 
for literal infringement purposes that claim meaning may be construed at 
a later time than filing or that application scope of a temporally fixed 
meaning for claim terms may expand so as to treat after-arising 
technologies as claim embodiments.76 None of the commentaries on the 
law recited in Part II refer to any such decision, nor to any Supreme Court 
decision directly on point.77 Thus, it appears that Schering is the first 
April 2017 on-line update) (explaining how the Graver Tank test was used in interpreting a means 
expression for literal infringement) (citing Lockheed Aircraft, 553 F.2d at 69); David Abraham, In re 
Donaldson, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 622, 624 (1994) (“The Federal Circuit has held [in 
Lockheed Aircraft] that elements known to be interchangeable to those of ordinary skill at the time 
the invention was made are deemed to have equivalent structure.”) (citing, inter alia, Lockheed 
Aircraft, 553 F.2d at 82); JoAnne Rosenblum, Patent Law—Doctrine of Equivalents—Has the 
Federal Circuit Dealt a Mortal Blow to the Doctrine of Equivalents?, Pennwalt Corporation v. 
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 671, 671 n.2 
(1989) (“Courts have adopted the doctrine of equivalents to interpret patent claims liberally to cover 
a reasonable range of equivalent devices.”) (citing Lockheed Aircraft, 553 F.2d at 79). And even if 
Lockheed Aircraft were somehow properly considered to have established an earlier panel precedent 
on literal infringement scope, the later en banc Ariad decision on written description implicitly 
overruled Lockheed Aircraft’s status as binding precedent given the axiomatic equivalency of validity 
and infringement scope and the invalidity of such claims. See authorities cited supra notes 10, 13 and 
accompanying text. 
76. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As noted above, however,
one Seventh Circuit case held in 1974 that claim meaning and application scope may expand for literal 
infringement. See Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974). And 
one Court of Claims decision from 1977 also could be read to reach the same result, although its 
language actually suggests a doctrine of equivalents analysis was employed. See Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp., 553 F.2d at 79 (the claim “should be accorded a broad and liberal interpretation so as to cover 
a reasonable range of equivalent devices performing substantially the same work in substantially the 
same manner to achieve substantially the same results as the claimed system read in light of the 
disclosed modes.”). 
77. Although the Supreme Court held in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), that patent infringement scope is not limited to literal claim meanings, it 
provided such protection under the doctrine of equivalents, and not by liberal claim construction that 
would expand claim meaning or application to embody after-arising technologies. See Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002) (“The language in the patent 
claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range 
of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly 
diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, 
and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest 
rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most 
efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described.”) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 347 (15 How. 1853) 
(emphasis added). Similarly, although the Supreme Court in Festo referred to equivalents that were 
“unforeseeable at the time of amendment” when authorizing application of the doctrine of equivalents 
to such amended claims, nothing in the Court’s discussion suggests that the meaning or application 
of the claim as originally filed or as amended could be expanded to reach such unforeseeable after-
arising technologies for literal infringement purposes. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738. 
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Supreme Court or Federal Circuit precedent to directly address this issue. 
And Schering held that for literal infringement, claim meaning may not 
expand to embrace and application scope may not include after-arising 
technologies, simultaneously suggesting that the claims would be invalid 
for lack of written description if they did so.78 
In Schering, the claims were directed to a particular form of 
interferon, “interferon alpha,” or “IFN-α,” originally identified in the 
specification as “leukocyte interferon,” but it was changed during 
prosecution to IFN-α because leukocytes had been determined to produce 
more than one kind of interferon and a committee of scientists adopted 
more precise terminology to reference the different forms. The district 
court had held that the change in terminology “imported years of scientific 
advance into the ‘901 patent’s disclosure and claims,” and prohibited 
those claims from being construed to include the later meaning under the 
“new matter” prohibition of § 132(a).79 As a result, the district court 
dismissed the suit on non-infringement grounds and dismissed as moot 
arguments that the claims (by applying to after-arising technologies) were 
invalid.80 In contrast, the Federal Circuit held that the substitution of 
terminology did not and was not intended to incorporate such after-
arising technologies and further limited the construction of the claim term 
“IFN-α” to the actual species of interferon that the applicant had 
discovered, conceived of, possessed, and disclosed (by deposit). Although 
one might try to read Schering as limited to claims where the applicant 
did not intend to claim after-arising technologies, the Court’s language 
was not so limited: “The term as used in the ‘901patent, however, did not 
and could not enlarge the scope of the patent to embrace technology 
arising after its filing.”81 In other words, the claims were required to be 
construed for literal infringement purposes in light of what the applicant 
had actually invented, disclosed, and claimed at the time of filing its 
application. 
Schering thus affirmed the non-infringement holding of the district 
court while also emphasizing that such temporal expansion of claim 
78. I differ here slightly from Professor Cotropia’s statement that “[w]hile not addressing the
question of after-arising equivalents directly, the Federal Circuit in Schering explains how a claim 
cannot literally cover later-developed technologies.” Cotropia, supra note 61, at 166. As explained 
below, both the district court and the Federal Circuit ruled on literal non-infringement grounds. See 
authorities cited infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
79. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
80. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (D. Del. 1999) (“Judgment will 
be entered against Schering and in favor of Amgen on plaintiffs’ infringement claim. The Court will 
also dismiss without prejudice Amgen’s [invalidity] counterclaims as moot.”). 
81. Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353 (emphasis added). See id. at 1353–54. 
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meaning would violate the written description doctrine.82 The court thus 
implicitly held, as it has repeated elsewhere, that it “is axiomatic that 
claims are [to be] construed the same way for both invalidity and 
infringement.”83 Accordingly, Schering establishes the law in the Federal 
Circuit on whether after-arising technologies can literally infringe claims 
in the absence of controlling Supreme Court or later en banc Federal 
Circuit precedent.84 
The Schering case was decided earlier than either the conflicting 
Superguide case or the conflicting Innogenetics case, as well as before the 
Kopykake, Plant Genetic Systems, and Chiron cases that are consistent 
with Schering.85 Perhaps unremarkably, the Schering case was neither 
relied on nor distinguished by—nor was it even cited in—the Plant 
Genetic Systems, Chiron, SuperGuide, or Innogenetics cases. And 
although the panel in Schering addressed an amended claim term added 
during prosecution, holding that it must be construed in the same manner 
as of the effective filing date of the original claim language, the same 
principal should apply to interpretation and construction of the meaning 
and application of originally filed claim language that is not amended. 
In Kopykake Enterprises., Inc. v. Lucks Co.,86 the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed the holding in Schering, stating that “when a claim term 
understood to have a narrow meaning when the application is filed later 
acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of the term is limited to 
what it was understood to mean at the time of filing.”87 This language 
clearly demonstrates the contemporaneous understanding that Schering 
82. See id. at 1351–52 (discussing the district court’s holding that the substitution of later
technological terminology imported new matter); id. at 1353–54 (“Because, at the time of the ‘901 
application, neither Dr. Weissmann nor others skilled in the art knew of the existence of, let alone the 
identity of, the specific polypeptides now identified as subtypes of IFN-α, those subtypes cannot be 
within the scope of the claims. The district court correctly concluded . . . that only one subspecies of 
alpha interferon was described and enabled in the specification.”) (citation omitted). 
83. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
84. See, e.g., Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (“Panel opinions are, of course, opinions of the court and may only be changed by the court 
sitting en banc.”). See also Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing 
Robert Bosch, 719 F.3d at 1316, UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 
1987), Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and 
Mother’s Rest., Inc. v. Mama’s Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
85. See authorities cited supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. Cf. Sarnoff, supra note 6, 
at 430 n.141. And the Seventh Circuit case is not binding precedent in the Federal Circuit. Laser 
Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974). 
86. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
87. Id. at 1383 (citing Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir.
2000)). 
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established a clear precedent on the issue and was not limited to the facts 
of the case and the applicant’s intent. In Kopykake Enterprises, the district 
court had found the claim term “screen printing” that was at issue should 
be construed broadly to cover “conventional” methods of applying images 
but that it did not apply to ink-jet printing methods for printing shapes on 
edible bases, as ink-jet printing was only emerging for printing on paper 
and was not “commonplace” for foodstuffs at the time of filing.88 The 
Federal Circuit rejected arguments that the prosecution history had 
disclaimed ink-jet printing. It held that the claim term should be 
understood broadly in light of the specification’s reference to 
“conventional printing processes” for foodstuffs, and affirmed the district 
court that although ink-jet printing was known (and cited in the 
prosecution record), it was not then conventional for foodstuffs and the 
claim would not have been understood in the art at the time of filing to 
include it.89 
In Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,90 the 
Federal Circuit avoided reaching the question of whether the claim 
construction should include after-arising technology based on 
amendments made to the claim during prosecution (to avoid an 
enablement rejection) that excluded such technology. Specifically, the 
applicant had added the terms “‘susceptible to infection and 
transformation by Agrobacterium and capable of regeneration’ of the 
plant and seed claims.”91 The district court construed that language from 
the perspective of a skilled practitioner as excluding monocot plants and 
cells (such as the allegedly infringing genetically modified corn) because 
the specification did not disclose methods for such transformation and the 
state of the art as of the filing date did not supply evidence that such viable 
transformation could be accomplished in monocots.92 The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the construction based on the prosecution history but also stated 
in dicta that “when a claim term understood to have a narrow meaning 
when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the literal 
scope of the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time 
of filing.”93 
88. See id. at 1379–80. 
89. Id. at 1382–84. Kopykake thus did not address after-arising technology but rather “nascent” 
technology, although not yet commonplace in the specific technological field. See authorities cited 
infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
90. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
91. Id. at 1344. 
92. See id. at 1345. 
93. Id. (citing Kopykake Enters., 264 F.3d at 1383). 
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The Federal Circuit also sustained the district court’s invalidity 
determinations of lack of enablement for certain cell claims that were 
conceded to include stably-transformed monocots, which were then 
known but “difficult to produce,” rejecting arguments that the district 
court should have made findings regarding whether such claims should 
receive “pioneering status.”94 As the court stated: 
PGS concedes that the cell claims cover monocot cells. Only by doing 
so can PGS sue DeKalb, which makes monocot products, for 
infringement. Having agreed that the cell claims encompass monocot 
cells, a later development, PGS’ reliance on Hogan ignores the validity-
infringement differentiation Hogan made.95 
Further, the court rejected arguments for broader scope for the enablement 
inquiry based on Hogan’s statement that “pioneering inventions ‘deserve 
broad claims to the broad concept,’” noting that Hogan’s discussion of 
pioneering status was “extended dicta.”96 
In Chiron Corp. v. Genetech, Inc.,97 the Federal Circuit held that 
claims construed broadly to include after-arising technology—in a later-
filed application claiming priority to an earlier application and thus to an 
earlier state of the art (which claims were improperly found by a jury to 
lack enablement because of after-arising technology)—actually lacked 
written description priority support in the earlier filed application and 
were thus invalid.98 As the claim was invalid, there was no need for the 
court to review the propriety of the district court’s claim construction for 
literal infringement purposes, which had included the after-arising 
technology within the scope of application of the later-application’s claim 
meaning. Specifically, the claims issuing from the 1986 patent application 
were construed by the district court to cover both humanized and chimeric 
antibodies that had not been discovered in 1984 (the date of the earlier 
patent application) and, thus, were invalid on written description grounds; 
given that any such after-arising technology was impermissible new 
matter as the claims of the later patent had been construed by the district 
court to cover the after-arising technology. 
94. Id. at 1339–41. 
95. Id. at 1341. 
96. Id. (quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 610 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring), and
citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606); id. (“We do not need to address all of the insightful comments made 
by the concurring judge; it is sufficient for the present case that we hold the district court did not err 
in not applying Hogan’s dicta to its enablement analysis.”). 
97. Chiron Corp. v. Genetech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
98. See id. at 1251–55. 
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Because the first publication that disclosed chimeric antibody 
technology did not appear until four months after this filing. . . . [T]his 
sequence of events shows that this new technology arose after the filing 
date and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds of the enablement 
requirement. . . . In the context of the 1984 application, the trial court 
and this court need not rely on enablement to support the jury’s verdict. 
The jury may have found that the 1984 application does not provide any 
support for the new matter, chimeric antibodies, claimed in the ‘561 
patent. Because chimeric antibody technology did not even exist at the 
time of the 1984 filing, the record conclusively supports that the Chiron 
scientists did not possess and disclose this technology in the February 
1984 filing. . . . In this case, the Chiron scientists, by definition, could 
not have possession of, and disclose, the subject matter of chimeric 
antibodies that did not even exist at the time of the 1984 application. 
Thus, axiomatically, Chiron cannot satisfy the written description 
requirement for the new matter appearing in the ‘561 patent, namely 
chimeric antibodies.99 
In Chiron, moreover, the Federal Circuit distinguished so-called 
“nascent” technology (known by the applicant) from after-arising 
technology, requiring that nascent technology be disclosed by the 
applicant.100 And Judge Bryson concurred separately to emphasize that In 
re Hogan should not be understood to have authorized claim meanings to 
expand for literal infringement so as to cover after-arising technologies, 
emphasizing that the court had recently “expressed reservations” about 
such a reading in Plant Genetic Systems.101 
Nevertheless, in Superguide v. DirecTV Enterprises,102 the Federal 
Circuit found literal infringement of a claim by after-arising technology 
99. Id. (citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605–06) (emphasis added). 
 100.  See id. at 1254 (“[A] patent document cannot enable technology that arises after the date 
of application. The law does not expect an applicant to disclose knowledge invented or developed 
after the filing date. Such disclosure would be impossible. Nascent technology, however, must be 
enabled with a ‘specific and useful teaching.’ The law requires an enabling disclosure for nascent 
technology because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from 
the patentee’s instruction.”) (citations omitted). Further, such disclosure in theory should include 
knowledge of the applicant that a nascent technology is in fact an equivalent and thus an embodiment 
of the claim language. Cf. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) 
(discussing known interchangeability of the allegedly equivalent technology). 
 101.  See id. at 1262 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“What must be guarded against, in my view, is to 
interpret Hogan to hold that claims that are enabled by the original application may be construed 
broadly enough to encompass technology that is not developed until later and was not enabled by the 
original application. Although there is language in Hogan that could be read to support such a result, 
this court has recently (and properly, in my view) expressed reservations about reading Hogan that 
broadly.”) (citing Plant Genetic Sys., N.V., v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003)). 
102.  SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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without then finding the claim to be invalid. The court rejected the district 
court’s claim constructions, which had excluded after-arising technology 
(digital television signals) from the construed meaning of the relevant 
claim language. The district court had treated such claim term meanings 
(e.g., the claim term “regularly received television signal”) as limited to 
the understanding in the art as of the filing date.103 But the Federal Circuit 
adopted constructions of the claim term meanings that included after-
arising technologies. In doing so, the court apparently distinguished 
functional claim terminology subject to the temporal limitation rule of 
§ 112(f) from structural claim terminology:
We begin our review of the district court’s construction of the asserted 
claim by agreeing with Gemstar that the court improperly relied on 
cases involving means-plus-function claims to conclude that later or 
“after-arising technologies” cannot fall within the literal scope of the 
claim at issue. Method and apparatus claims not written in means-plus-
function format are not necessarily limited to that disclosed in the 
specification but rather are defined by the language of the claims 
themselves.104 
The court rejected the district court’s reliance on the understanding 
of skilled persons that “regularly received” signals as of the filing date 
could not mean digital signals (when digital televisions were not in 
common use at that time), but the court distinguished the claims at issue 
from those in Kopykake by stating that the term “regularly received” “did 
not explicitly limit the disputed claim language to technologies that were 
‘conventional’ at the time of the invention.”105 Further, it appears that the 
court applied the broadest dictionary meaning approach to construing the 
103.  Id. at 877. 
 104.  Id. at 878 (citing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“It is the claims that measure the invention.”)). SRI, however, addressed 
concerns about not limiting structural claim language to a particular method of operation during 
prosecution, nor reading the claim language to import all structural limitations in the specification, 
and that claim meaning is not limited to the best mode disclosed, and went en banc to reject its earlier 
precedent that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is a question of law, and remanded for factfinding 
regarding application of that doctrine. See SRI Int’l, 775 F.2d at 1118–25. Nevertheless, SRI contains 
dicta when discussing non-restriction of claims to the best mode disclosed that were relied on by 
SuperGuide to permit expansion of claim meaning to after-arising technologies, subject to the reverse 
doctrine. See id. at 1121 (“The law does not require the impossible. Hence, it does not require that an 
applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his 
invention. The law recognizes that patent specifications are written for those skilled in the art, and 
requires only that the inventor describe the ‘best mode’ known at the time to him of making and using 
the invention.”). 
105.  Id. at 879 (quoting Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1380, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001)). 
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claims at issue, an approach articulated in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. 
Telegenix, Inc.,106 but which all of the judges of the en banc Phillips Corp. 
decision later rejected.107 
In Innogenetics v. Abbott Laboratories,108 the Federal Circuit held 
that a kit using Realtime polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to hybridize 
samples to probes for hepatitis C virus literally infringed the method claim 
at issue.109 The court construed broadly the claim term of detecting 
“formation of a complex” between the sample and probe, holding that the 
claim did not require contemporaneous detection of the complex itself 
(given that the claim included the term “complex as formed,” which 
Abbott argued imposed a temporal limit on detection, and that Abbott’s 
PCR method destroyed the complex so it only detected the fact that a 
complex had been formed earlier).110 The court relied on Superguide to 
state that literal infringement can be found for after-arising technology if 
“valid claims . . . are drafted broadly enough.”111 The court held that the 
claims literally infringed because Abbott had forfeited its district court 
argument (by raising it at the last minute) that Realtime PCR “was not 
known to the ordinary artisan at the time of the filing.”112 As noted above, 
however, if claims are drafted broadly using future-regarding terminology 
or employ terminology that does not convey a future sense but 
nevertheless is construed to include after-arising technology, such claims 
should be held invalid for lack of enablement and of written description.113 
Thus, the statements regarding literal infringement and after-arising 
technology in Innogentics were unnecessary dicta, both because the 
argument had been waived and because the supposed later-arising 
technology was actually known at the time of filing the claims.114 
In summary, absent clear Supreme Court or en banc Federal Circuit 
precedent superseding Schering, Schering establishes the current law for 
106.  Tex. Dig. Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 107.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); id. at 
1328–30 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1332 (Mayer, J., dissenting); SuperGuide Corp., 358 F.3d at 
874–75 (quoting Tex. Dig. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d at 1202, and Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 
F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
108.  Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
109.  See id. at 1368. 
110.  Id. at 1370–71 (emphasis added). 
111.  See id. at 1371–72 (citing SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 878–80 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
112.  Id. at 1371. 
113.  See authorities cited supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
114.  See Innogenetics, N.V., 512 F.3d at 1372 (“Additionally, Abbott itself has put forth 
evidence that Realtime PCR did in fact exist by the time the inventors filed their PCT application in 
1992, and by the time they applied for the ‘704 patent in 1994.”). 
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literal infringement in regard to after-arising technologies. Of course, the 
Federal Circuit’s rule that the first panel opinion establishes binding 
circuit precedent may be followed more in the breach than in the 
observance, as should be evident from Superguide and Innogenetics. It is 
also subject to the Atlantic Thermoplastics “heresy . . . mutiny. . . . 
illegal[ity]” problem that different panels of judges may interpret 
Supreme Court precedents differently, treating an earlier panel decision 
as invalid without taking the issue en banc.115 But the Federal Circuit 
rarely goes en banc to resolve such differing views of conflicting Supreme 
Court precedents, and the Federal Circuit did not justify its Superguide 
and Innogenetics dicta and holdings on the Supreme Court pioneering 
invention precedents. As reflected in In re Hogan and the cases above, the 
Supreme Court’s pioneering invention patent doctrine cases do not clearly 
supersede the Schering holding that prevents after-arising technologies 
from falling within the scope of claim meaning or application for literal 
infringement purposes.116 And the Federal Circuit rarely seeks to resolve 
conflicting panel precedents that result when the earlier-in-time panel 
decisions are ignored or are only selectively followed.117 
In contrast, as discussed in the next Part of this Article, current 
§ 112(f) may be understood to have required the holding in Schering. If
structural claim terms are not construed as limited to technological 
equivalents known as of the filing date to be embodiments, those terms 
may effectively be considered functional claim terms. Temporally unfixed 
structural claiming language requires functional testing to determine 
 115.  Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(Rich, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The Atlantic panel, [which had refused 
to follow the earlier precedent in the Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991),] continued [to explain that]: ‘A[n earlier panel] decision that fails to consider 
Supreme Court precedent does not control if the court [i.e. the Atlantic panel] determines that the 
prior panel [in the Scripps case] would have reached a different conclusion if it had considered 
controlling precedent.’ This is not only insulting to the [prior] Scripps panel (Chief Judge Markey, 
Judge Newman and a visiting judge), it is mutiny. It is heresy. It is illegal.”). 
116.  See authorities cited supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 117.  For example, the en banc Federal Circuit finally resolved the issue in Atlantic 
Thermoplastics only 17 years later, and did so by violating the axiomatic principle that claims are to 
be construed the same way for infringement as for validity. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 
F.3d 1282, 1291–95 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (relevant portion en banc) (affirming the later-in-time Atlantic 
Thermoplastics panel holding that product-by-process claims may have different meanings for 
infringement than validity, finally resolving the inconsistency of the two prior panel decisions and the 
consequent uncertainty of the law during the intervening years, but abrogating the principle that 
claims are axiomatically to be construed the same way for validity as for infringement); id. at 1318 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“For the first time, claims are construed differently for validity and for 
infringement. It has been an inviolate rule that patent claims are construed the same way for validity 
and for infringement.”) (citations omitted). 
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whether any after-arising technology should be considered to be 
equivalent to disclosed structural embodiments. Such temporally unfixed 
structural terms therefore should also be subject to the § 112(f) rule of 
claim construction for functional claiming language, as it has been 
interpreted by the Federal Circuit in Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. 
v. Cardinal Industries, Inc.118 and Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International,
Inc.119 That interpretation temporally fixes literal infringement meaning 
and application scope, restricting it to technologies equivalent to those 
disclosed in the specification and (at least constructively) known to be 
equivalent (and thus to be claim embodiments) at the time of filing.120 
IV. FUNCTIONAL CLAIM TERMS DO NOT EXTEND TO AFTER-ARISING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND STRUCTURAL CLAIM TERMS NOT TEMPORALLY 
LIMITED TO KNOWN EQUIVALENT EMBODIMENTS SHOULD BE TREATED 
AS FUNCTIONAL. 
Prior to the 1952 Act, the Supreme Court expressed substantial 
ambivalence about its earlier approaches to permissible claim scope, 
particularly in regard to functionally claimed inventions. In the 1946 
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing v. Walker case,121 the Supreme Court 
precluded the use of functional claiming language for literal infringement 
purposes that would treat any after-arising equivalent technologies as 
construed claim embodiments, at least at the point of novelty of the claim: 
We must, however, determine whether, as petitioner charges, the claims 
here held valid run afoul of Rev. Stat. § 4888 because they do not 
describe the invention but use “conveniently functional language at the 
exact point of novelty.” . . . The language of the claim thus describes this 
most crucial element in the ‘new’ combination in terms of what it will 
do rather than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its 
arrangement in the new combination apparatus. We have held that a 
claim with such a description of a product is invalid as a violation of 
Rev. Stat. § 4888. . . . It is urged that our conclusion is in conflict with 
the decision of Continental Paper Bag Co. . . . In that case, however, the 
claims structurally described the physical and operating relationship of 
all the crucial parts of the novel combination.122 
118.  Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
119.  Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
120.  See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, 145 F.3d at 1310; Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1320. 
121.  Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946). 
122.  See id. at 8–9, 14 (emphasis added) (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 
U.S. 405 (1908), and Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928)). 
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In response, Congress revised the Halliburton holding to impose a 
particular rule of construction for claims using functional claiming 
language. Then § 112, ¶ 3 (later ¶ 6, and now § 112(f)) provides: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means 
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of 
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be 
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.123 
The Supreme Court has not weighed in on this provision, except (as noted 
above) to hold in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.124 
that it did not impliedly repeal the Court’s doctrine of equivalents decision 
in 1950 in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.125 
Graver Tank had authorized patent protection beyond the construed scope 
of meaning and application of patent claims.126 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit has construed § 112(f) to impose a 
temporal restriction on the meaning and application of functional claim 
terms, restricting them from after-arising technologies. This rule of claim 
interpretation restricts claim meaning and application scope to those 
structural technologies embodying the identically claimed function that 
were known at the time of filing to perform the function and to be 
equivalent to structural embodiments of that function disclosed in the 
specification. As the Federal Circuit stated in Chiuminatta Concrete 
Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indutries, Inc.:127 
The doctrine of equivalents is necessary because one cannot predict the 
future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an invention may be 
developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so 
insubstantial a change from what is claimed in the patent that it should 
be held to be an infringement. Such a variant, based on after-developed 
technology, could not have been disclosed in the patent. Even if such an 
element is found not to be a § 112, ¶ 6, equivalent because it is not 
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis should 
not foreclose it from being an equivalent under the doctrine of 
equivalents.128 
123.  35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018). 
124.  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27–28 (1997). 
125.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
126.  See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 27–28; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 608–
09; see authorities cited supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
127.  Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
128.  Id. at 1310 (emphasis added). 
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One year later, the Federal Circuit elaborated on its holding in 
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts to make this implication even clearer in 
Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc.:129 
As this court has recently clarified, a structural equivalent under § 112 
must have been available at the time of the issuance of the claim. An 
equivalent structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace technology 
developed after the issuance of the patent because the literal meaning of 
a claim is fixed upon its issuance. An “after arising equivalent” 
infringes, if at all, under the doctrine of equivalents.130 
And as the court has more recently explained: 
In Chiuminatta, we explained that there are two differences between the 
equivalence determination made for literal infringement purposes under 
§ 112(f) and a doctrine of equivalents determination for the same
limitation: timing and [identity rather than just similarity of] function.131 
Equivalence under section 112(f) is evaluated at the time of issuance. 
Equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents, in contrast, is evaluated 
at the time of infringement. Hence, an after-arising technology, a 
technology that did not exist at the time of patenting, can be found to be 
an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents even though it cannot be 
an equivalent under the literal infringement analysis of § 112(f).132 
Thus, whenever such functional claiming language is construed to be 
present (under the en banc Federal Circuit’s new standards133 for 
determining whether claim language is subject to the § 112(f) interpretive 
rule), the functional claim terms cannot be literally infringed by any after-
arising technologies. This is true even if the after-arising technology 
performs the identical function and is structurally equivalent to disclosed 
embodiments in the specification, so long as the identity of function or the 
structural equivalency was not known (at least constructively to a person 
of ordinary skill in the art) at the time of filing. Similarly, such functional 
claim terms also should not apply to any nascent technologies existing as 
of the filing date but that were not known in the art to perform the function 
129.  Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
130.  Id. at 1320 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
131.  See Chiuminatta Concrete, 145 F.3d at 1310; Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 
F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 132.  Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp., 743 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing 
Chiuminatta Concrete, 145 F.3d at 1310, and Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1320) (emphasis added). 
 133.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relevant 
portion en banc) (rejecting various earlier panel decisions that had created a “strong” presumption 
against the application of § 112(f) when the claim limitation at issue did not employ the specific terms 
“means for” or “step for” but nevertheless should be construed as functional claiming language that 
triggers the statutory construction rule). 
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and to be equivalent structures. To so hold would render such claims 
invalid for lack of written description under the Ariad Pharmaceuticals 
possession test as the specification would not objectively disclose that the 
inventor “visualized or recognized” that its functional claim terms 
embraced structures unknown-to-be equivalent or unknown to perform 
the required functions.134 
Thus, for literal infringement purposes, functional claiming language 
must be restricted (under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 112(f)) 
to structures known to perform the recited function and known to be 
equivalent at the time of filing. This is all the more true for after-arising 
technologies that require later-developed testing methods in order for a 
skilled practitioner to recognize or to demonstrate that the after-arising 
technologies perform the same function and are structurally equivalent.135 
The § 112(f) temporal fixation rule must apply, unless the axiomatic 
equivalency of claim meaning for validity and claim meaning for literal 
infringement is to be violated. 
But what about structural claim terms that Congress (and the Federal 
Circuit by construction) has not statutorily subjected to § 112(f)’s 
temporal fixation rule? I believe that such structural language also should 
subject to the same temporal fixation rule, applying only to structures that 
were known in the art at the time of filing to be equivalent structures 
within the meaning of the structural claim language. 
The reason for restricting such structural claiming language to 
known-to-be equivalent structures is based on treating the claim terms (as 
concepts) to be “intensional” definitions that specify the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their meaning and thus for their factual 
 134.  Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the need to explicitly disclose in the 
specification any nascent technology). 
 135.  Cf. Cotropia, supra note 61, at 153 (“Inventors can write claim language to include 
technologies unknown at the time of drafting by using functional or generally descriptive terms so as 
not to ‘date’ the claim terms.”); Timothy C. Saulsbury, Pioneers Versus Improvers: Enabling Optimal 
Patent Claim Scope, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 456 (2010) (“When improvements 
are framed in terms of newly-invented (or newly discovered) properties for preexisting things, it 
becomes clear that thing construction can conceal the post-filing growth in literal scope that is 
required for a claim to encompass later-developed technology; a court need only engage in a manner 
of thing construction that overlooks the newly-invented property that marks the improvement as later 
developed.”); id. at 456 n.99 (“This elimination ‘renders the after-arising property irrelevant to the 
identity of thing-types and the distinctions between them. When the after-arising property is not a 
definitional property of the tallied thing-types, the allegedly infringing [improvement] can be thrown 
into a preexisting conceptual thing-type basket created for the constructively disclosed [i.e., enabled,] 
embodiments.’”) (quoting Collins, supra note 3, at 518). 
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application.136 If claim scope were not temporally fixed in this manner, it 
would require functional testing to determine whether structures that are 
not already known to be within the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
the meaning of structural claim terms exhibit those conditions of meaning. 
This would effectively convert the structural claim term into a functional 
claim term. Conversely, where functional testing demonstrates that the 
necessary and sufficient functional conditions of structural meaning are 
lacking, the alleged structural equivalent should be excluded from the 
claim meaning under the so-called reverse doctrine of equivalents.137 
As Professor Chisum noted in his treatise, “[i]t would seem to follow 
that, to the extent that the meaning of a patent claim depends on the state 
of the art or on tests, standards or measurements established in the art, the 
time framework should be the filing date.”138 And if functional testing is 
required to determine whether technologies not already recognized as 
structural term embodiments should be treated as exhibiting the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of structural meaning, then the structural claim 
term is effectively operating as a functional limitation139 and should also 
be subject to the § 112(f) temporal fixation rule.140 
 136.  See generally Roy T. Cook, Intensional Definition, in A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
LOGIC 155 (2009). In contrast, one might treat claim meaning as extensional, requiring analogical 
similarity judgments to determine meaning rather than using logical deduction to determine the 
application (or not) of necessary and sufficient conditions of intensional meaning to particular sets of 
facts. Cf., e.g., Terje Aaberge & Rajendra Akerkar, Ontology and Ontology Construction: 
Background and Practices, 9 INT’L J. COMPUTER SCI. & APPLICATIONS 32, 32 (2012) (“There are 
two ways of representing meaning formally, referred to as extensional and intensional and 
corresponding to the complementary theories of meaning, semantics and pragmatics; semantics 
focuses on the relation between words and what they stand for, their denotata, while pragmatics 
concern how context contributes to meaning.”). 
 137.  See, e.g., Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 569, 571 (1898) (“But, 
after all, even if the patent for a machine be a pioneer, the alleged infringer must have done something 
more than reach the same result. He must have reached it by substantially the same or similar means, 
or the rule that the function of a machine cannot be patented is of no practical value. To say that the 
patentee of a pioneer invention for a new mechanism is entitled to every mechanical device which 
produces the same result is to hold, in other language, that he is entitled to patent his function. Mere 
variations of form may be disregarded, but the substance of the invention must be there. . . . 
Conceding that the functions of the two devices are practically the same, the means used in 
accomplishing this function are so different that we find it impossible to say, even in favor of a 
primary patent, that they are mechanical equivalents.”). 
138.  CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 35, at § 18.03(2)(g). 
 139.  See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–51 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see 
authorities cited supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
140.  Similarly, even if structural claim meaning is treated as an extensional definition, requiring 
similarity comparisons to disclosed embodiments to determine equivalency and to build up the set of 
embodiments of meaning, determining such similarity and including it within the scope of that 
extensional meaning will still require functional testing. Cf. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure 
of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1205–06 (2008) 
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Further, the knowledge acquired in the process of such functional 
testing to determine the application of structural meaning may lead to 
further refinement of the meaning of the structural claim language.141 In 
doing so, it may make clearer the functional requirements that were 
intended by the earlier structural meaning.142 Thus, failing to fix temporal 
meaning or temporal application of meaning to structures that were known 
at the time of filing to be equivalent substitutes to embodiments of 
structural claim terms effectively converts structural claiming terms into 
functional claiming terms.143 
In many cases, it may be extremely difficult to determine the implicit 
functions of structural claim terms in order to determine what things in 
the world exhibit the necessary and sufficient conditions of structural 
meaning (as of the effective filing date). For example, it may be unclear 
what functions must be performed for some new combination of structures 
to constitute a claimed door “knob.”144 And it may require later 
(discussing the written description “possession” test and noting that “[r]ecitation of the features or 
properties of a genus corresponds to definition by intension, or definition per genus et differentiam. 
In this classical mode of definition, a thing is defined by specifying the proximate genus to which it 
belongs, and those properties which differentiate it from other members of the genus. The alternative 
mode of description suggested by Lilly, enumeration of a representative number of members of the 
genus, corresponds to definition by extension, or definition by type. It proceeds by designating some 
individual or group of individuals as central or typical members of the genus and determining 
membership in the genus by degree of resemblance. Yet every claim is in the end a genus claim.”); 
Lemley, supra note 53, at 120 n.81 (“The effective scope of those claims may still expand over time 
for another reason. . . . [A]s new species within the genus are discovered, the practical scope of the 
patent is broadened to cover new products. But the legal scope of the claimed invention remains the 
same.”). 
 141.  See Lefstin, supra note 140, at 1205–06. It may also alter claim meanings, typically by 
expansion and also by potentially suggesting more precise, intentional definitions of the meanings for 
the claimed structural terms. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); see authorities cited supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 142.  Thus, in Schering, the court held that further analysis and testing that led to expansion of 
structural term meaning had to be limited to the earlier understanding, or it would have imported new 
matter. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1352. 
 143.  Cf. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“stating in reference to the doctrine of equivalents that consideration ‘must be given 
to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the 
other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether 
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not 
contained in the patent with one that was.’”) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. 
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)) (emphasis added). 
 144.  See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 264 (1850) (“The improvement 
consists in making the knobs of clay or porcelain, and in fitting them for their application to doors, 
locks, and furniture, and various other uses to which they may be adapted . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
Cf. Lefstin, supra note 140, at 1199 (“The question of ‘possession of the invention’ is simply not a 
meaningful inquiry under our current claiming system. In the peripheral claiming system, ‘the 
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developments in the state of the art to actually determine what those 
functions were that established the conditions of meaning of the structural 
terms as they were understood as of the filing date (which may then lead 
to further specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of structural 
term meanings).145 Thus, unless structural claim term meaning and 
application scope is fixed by reference to technologies at least 
constructively known by a skilled artisan as of the filing date to exhibit 
those functions and to be embodiments, the claim term should be 
considered a functional claim term subject to § 112(f), just as if it 
employed more explicitly functional claiming language.146 Consequently, 
under current law (as § 112(f) has been construed), all claim terms should 
have temporally fixed construed meanings and temporally fixed 
applications of those meanings for purposes of both validity and 
infringement determinations. At least until the interpretation of § 112(f) 
invention’ is a bundle of properties recited by the claims, defining the perimeter of the patentee’s 
legal right to exclude.”) (emphasis added). 
 145.  See, e.g., cf. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1567–68 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (“The operative definition for purposes of equivalency analysis is the intended function as seen 
in the context of the patent, the prosecution history, and the prior art. Based on our review of these 
materials, we conclude that no reasonable jury could have adopted the broad definition suggested by 
the trial court. As noted, the specification expressly defines fibrin binding as a critical component of 
the ‘function’ of human t-PA. . . . Other evidence confirms this. According to a British patent 
application filed by Foundation, it is critical in a therapeutic sense—it reduces the risk of 
hemorrhaging. Moreover, as Drs. Goeddel and Collen testified, the fibrin binding affinity of human 
t-PA is a critical distinction between this protein and the two prior plasminogen activators, urokinase 
and streptokinase. Thus, a functional definition of t-PA which ignores this distinction would result in 
a range of equivalents which impermiss[i]bly reads on the prior art.”) (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 
at 609; Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) 
(emphasis added). 
 146.  Cf. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1946) (“Neither in 
the specification, the drawing, nor in the claims here under consideration, was there any indication 
that the patentee contemplated any specific structural alternative for the acoustical resonator or for 
the resonator’s relationship to the other parts of the machine. . . . Just how many different devices 
there are of various kinds and characters which would serve to emphasize these echoes, we do not 
know. The Halliburton device, alleged to infringe, employs an electric filter for this purpose. In this 
age of technological development there may be many other devices beyond our present information 
or indeed our imagination which will perform that function and yet fit these claims. . . . Yet if 
Walker’s blanket claims be valid, no device to clarify echo waves, now known or hereafter invented, 
whether the device be an actual equivalent of Walker’s ingredient or not, could be used in a 
combination such as this, during the life of Walker’s patent.”); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents 
and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 905–06 (2013) (“Most software 
patents today are written in functional terms. If courts would faithfully apply the 1952 Act, limiting 
those claims to the actual algorithms the patentees disclosed and their equivalents, they could prevent 
overclaiming by software patentees and solve much of the patent thicket problem that besets software 
innovation.”). 
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is further changed by Congress,147 the Supreme Court, or the Federal 
Circuit en banc. 
Congress was careful in 1952 to preserve much of the prior law 
regarding claim scope when it adopted the predecessor to § 112(f). 
Although Congress expressly rejected proposed legislative language that 
would have explicitly authorized functional claiming language to apply to 
after-arising technologies, Congress did not thereby clearly prohibit such 
a judicial interpretation.148 As discussed above, the Supreme Court has 
not interpreted § 112(f) except peripherally in regard to not overruling the 
doctrine of equivalents, and the Federal Circuit has not to date construed 
§ 112(f) to permit the functional claiming of after-arising technologies.149
For the additional reasons expressed above, structural claiming language 
should be treated the same way. 
Nevertheless, change remains possible. Congress or the courts could 
permit literal infringement scope to expand to technologies not known to 
be equivalent embodiments of functional or structural claiming terms as 
of the filing date. But if such changes were to be made, they will raise 
many more, and more complex issues in addition to breaking the 
axiomatic symmetry of claim scope for validity and literal infringement 
 147.  Cf., e.g., Press Release, Senator Thom Tillis, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, 
Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019) 
(available at https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-
and-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/53BM-
DDGK]) (Draft 101 Legislative Language circulated by Senators Tillis and Coons for U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearings, June 4, 2019. Draft language 
apparently intended to codify the holding in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–
51 (Fed. Cir. 2015): “Section 112 (f) Functional Claim Elements— An element in a claim expressed 
as a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof shall be 
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and 
equivalents thereof.”). 
 148.  See Sarnoff, DOE Part II, supra note 20, at 490–91 (“A coordinating committee of patent 
law associations had suggested specific changes to a draft of what was then H.R. 3760, which included 
a recommendation to add to the mean-plus-function claim provision language authorizing such claims 
to encompass equivalents ‘whether or not known at the time the invention was made.’ The legislative 
history is silent as to why Congress did not adopt the recommendation. Given the consistent prior 
case law limiting improvement inventions to known technological equivalents, Congress most likely 
would have adopted such language if it had meant to encourage the courts to provide protection for 
later-arising equivalents of such functionally drafted claims.”) (citation omitted). Cf. id. at 473 (A 
long line of cases under the 1870 Act imposed “limits on claim scope and claiming language [that] 
prevented improvement invention patents from treating as equivalents to claimed embodiments all 
later-arising, patentable or unpatentable substituted technologies. These limits also prevented 
pioneering invention patents from claiming or having their claims apply to later-arising, substituted 
technologies that the inventor had not invented, disclosed, or enabled.”). 
149.  See authorities cited supra notes 27–30, 127–133 and accompanying text. 
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purposes.150 Temporally expanding literal claim scope will duplicate the 
function of the doctrine of equivalents in protecting after-arising 
technologies, and thereby further complicate claim construction.151 It will 
also require determining whether such temporally expanding claim scope 
not conceived by the inventor constitutes patent eligible subject matter152 
or otherwise is permissibly claimed.153 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that current law does not permit structural claim term 
scope for literal infringement to encompass after-arising technologies will 
have substantial implications. In contrast, current law interpreting 
§ 112(f) treats functional claim term scope as limited to equivalents
known as of the filing date. 
As I stated many years ago, echoing the concerns noted by Judge 
Miller in his concurring opinion in In re Hogan154: 
[t]he 1952 Patent Act . . . should be interpreted to have authorized, but 
not to have required, application of functional claims for improvement 
 150.  See authority cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. Cf. Stephens, supra note 14, at 5 
(“[A]s Kitchin LJ put it in Smith & Nephew v. Convatec, [[2015] EWCA Civ 607] ‘the scope of 
any . . . claim must be exactly the same whether one is considering infringement or validity.’”). 
 151.  Cf. Stephens, supra note 14, at 4–5 (discussing two recent U.K. cases applying the new 
Actavis standard that found the accused technologies to fall within a purposive construction, but if 
they had not done so then they should not be considered equivalents even though they achieved the 
same function). 
 152.  See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 117 (15 How. 1853) (“Professor Morse has not 
discovered, that the electric or galvanic current will always print at a distance, no matter what may be 
the form of the machinery or mechanical contrivances through which it passes.”); Risdon Iron & 
Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1895) (“That certain processes of manufacture 
are patentable is as clear as that certain others are not, but nowhere is the distinction between them 
accurately defined. There is somewhat of the same obscurity in the line of demarkation . . . between 
a new article of manufacture, which is universally held to be patentable, and the function of a machine, 
which it is equally clear is not. It may be said in general that processes of manufacture which involve 
chemical or other similar elemental action are patentable, though mechanism may be necessary in the 
application or carrying out of such process, while those which consist solely in the operation of a 
machine are not. . . . But, if the operation of his device be purely mechanical, no such considerations 
apply, since the function of the machine is entirely independent of any chemical or other similar 
action.”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–58 (1928) (“But 
an inventor may not describe a particular starch glue which will perform the function of animal glue 
and then claim all starch glues which have those functions, or even all starch glues made with three 
parts of water and alkali, since starch glues may be made with three parts of water and alkali that do 
not have those properties. . . . [T]he attempt to broaden product claims by describing the product 
exclusively in terms of its use or function is subject to the same vice as is the attempt to describe a 
patentable device or machine in terms of its function. As a description of the invention, it is 
insufficient, and, if allowed, would extend the monopoly beyond the invention.”) (emphasis added). 
154.  See authorities cited supra note 22. 
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inventions to later-arising equivalent technologies. Nothing in the 
language adopted by Congress reflects an intent to freeze judicial 
interpretation regarding the permissible scope of future embodiments 
that can be claimed using such functional language. To the extent that 
the courts decide to apply functional claims for improvement inventions 
to later-arising substituted technologies, however, they will have to 
contend with two hundred years of patent claim scope doctrines and with 
the Constitutional mandate to promote progress.155 
It also should be apparent that changing the law of literal 
infringement to explicitly permit structural and functional claim terms to 
encompass after-arising technologies would have dramatic consequences. 
It should be authorized only with the greatest of care and subjected to 
articulated limits.156 And it should be done only after substantial further 
analysis of the likely consequences and further evaluations of the 
continued validity and scope of the pioneering invention patent doctrine 
and its relationship to eligible subject matter, claim construction, and the 
doctrine of equivalents principles.157 
155.  Sarnoff, DOE Part II, supra note 20, at 491. 
 156.  Cf. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843, 848 (1990) (“[C]ontrary to what Kitch suggests, we do not presume 
that granting broad scope to an initial inventor induces more effective development and future 
invention. We regard this as an open question . . . . Theoretical argument alone, however, cannot 
resolve the question of whether technical advance proceeds more vigorously and effectively under 
competition or under a regime where one person or organization has a considerable amount of control 
over developments . . . . It is difficult to resolve issues like these when a patent is filed; at that point, 
no one knows what future developments will follow or how difficult it will be to achieve them. Thus, 
there is an argument for granting a broad set of claims for pioneering inventions. . . . But surely one 
can go too far.”). 
 157.  Cf. Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: 
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 2003–04 (2005) (“Despite a 
solid theoretical basis for giving pioneers generous protection against literal infringement, it is not 
immediately clear that the high social value of pioneer inventions justifies special treatment under the 
DOE. If not for frictions, pioneers could get appropriately broad scope by relying on the claim 
language in their patents. In the absence of frictions that constrain claim scope, more generous 
treatment of pioneers under the DOE would over-reward pioneers and possibly stifle cumulative 
innovation. . . . Not surprisingly, we suggest that refinement costs, rather than frictions, may be larger 
for pioneers. In particular, we conjecture that many pioneer inventors face a tougher problem of 
visualizing and enumerating the many possible methods of imitating a pioneer invention.”). 
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